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The previous chapter showed how foreign banks gradually took hold of  most of  the 
banking assets in Central and Eastern Europe, and discussed the importance of  foreign 
banks as suppliers of  credit to the private sector. Overall, it took up to 1998 before 
foreign banks started lending to the private sector in a way proportionate to the relative 
scale of  their assets in the banking sector. This chapter extends the analysis of  the role 
foreign banks play in the CEE banking sector examining the following topics: (i) how 
does foreign bank size relate to the size of  a domestically owned bank? (ii) what are the 
main components of  foreign banks’ assets? In detail I will examine (iii) the content and 
the maturity structure of  the loan portfolio and (iv) the main items of  the liability side 
and the maturity of  customer deposits. This chapter presents the main trends in foreign 
banks’ balance sheets over a period of  8 years. Our starting point is the year 1995, when 
state-owned banks still owned the majority of  assets in Central and Eastern Europe, 
and foreign banks hardly played a role in the financial system. The analysis goes up to 
2002, when credit to the private sector in Central and Eastern Europe started to pick 
up after more than a decade of  stunted intermediation as shown in chapter 1. 
This chapter is comparative in nature. Whereas chapter 1 predominantly focused 
on the role of  foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe, this chapter introduces two 
benchmarks, both related to the (future) accession of  Central and Eastern European 
countries as new Member States of  the European Union. The first benchmark consists 
of  banks in the fifteen countries that used to be the corpus of  the European Union up 
to May 2004: hereafter referred to as the EU15. Ex ante I hypothesize that, due to 
relative geo-political closeness and the prospect of  EU accession, size and operations 
of  CEE (foreign) banks converge to EU15 levels. The second benchmark consists 
of  banks in European transition economies which are geographically, culturally and 
institutionally more distant from the EU15. These countries do not have the prospect 
of  EU accession and their economies are less developed than those of  the CEE 
countries. More specifically, the second benchmark contains 16 transition countries 
in South Eastern Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of  Independent States (CIS). 
SEE countries include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and 
Montenegro, and the CIS countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. Recently, the EBRD 2006 Transition Report has stated that the banking 
*    Based on Naaborg, I.J. and L.J.R. Scholtens, A comparative study of  banks’ balance sheets in 
the European Union and European transition countries, 1995-2003, International Finance Review, 




reform in the CIS countries is much less advanced than in the CEE countries. Ex ante 
I hypothesize that a microanalysis of  bank balance sheets will confirm that the scale 
and scope of  CEE (foreign) banks exceed those of  SEE/CIS banks.
 The structure of  this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the methodology 
and the data. In section 2.3, trends in foreign bank size are discussed. Sections 2.4 and 
2.5 present analyses on assets and liabilities. Section 2.6 summarizes and concludes.
2.2 Methodology and data  
The methodology and variables in this chapter differ from those in chapter 1. Instead 
of  using macro-data, the chapter takes a micro approach and the analysis is based 
only on information contained in banks’ balance sheets. The balance sheets are 
examined in three ways. First of  all, they are informative on the size of  the banks. 
Within the analysis of  bank size, the section will distinguish between foreign banks 
and domestic banks in order to compare bank size in the three regions. Second, assets 
and liabilities are analysed separately on (i) the main components and (ii) maturity 
of  loans and deposits. Within the set of  loans the chapter aims at assessing the main 
loan products. 
 The analysis in this chapter is based on 31,319 observations from the balance 
sheets of  commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks in the period 
1995-2002, provided by Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope database. Appendix 6 shows the 
number of  banks for each country in the sample.1 Appendix 7 illustrates the structure 
of  the sample by showing relative bank assets of  each country as a share of  total bank 
assets in each of  the three regions. In Central and Eastern Europe, banks in Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary together account for almost 70 per cent of  banking 
assets, while in the SEE/CIS group Russia clearly dominates, with approximately three 
quarters of  the region’s assets. 
 Using bank ownership information from several issues of  the BankScope database 
made it possible to identify domestic owned banks and foreign owned banks2. Appendix 
8 shows the number of  foreign and domestic banks in each of  the three regions. 
2.3 Bank size
Table 2.1 shows the average bank size in each country for the period 1995-2002. 
Banks in the three regions differ considerably in size. In 1995, the average bank in 
the EU15 was 8 times larger than an average bank in Central and Eastern Europe; 
1 For the purpose of  sample homogeneity, only the commercial banks, savings banks and coo-
perative banks in BankScope were selected out of  a total set of  nine specializations defined by 
BankScope. 
2 One of  the drawbacks of  BankScope is that bank ownership information is given only for the 
most recent update. I thank Mark Wessels and Bob Vaanhold at Bureau van Dijk Electronic 
Publishing for making previous versions available, and Aljar Meesters for his assistance with the 
preparation of  the dataset.
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by 2002 that multiple had increased to 11. However, the average CEE bank grew 
considerably relative to a SEE/CIS bank. In 1995 the average CEE bank was only 
twice as large as a SEE/CIS bank, while in 2002 this multiple had risen to 4. 
Table 2.1 Average bank size (€mln), 1995-2002
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
EU15 4,626 8,055 10,493 11,425 12,470 13,806 14,056 15,591
(4,457) (6,374) (9,929) (9,459) (10,046) (11,081) (12,504) (13,704)
CEE countries 560 590 562 761 775 915 1,171 1,328
(521) (604) (564) (726) (615) (803) (966) (1,050)
SEE/CIS countries 291 262 360 261 372 356 328 309
(488) (467) (597) (384) (520) (627) (515) (389)
Bank size is determined as the average of  country averages. The standard deviation of  the 
country averages is in parentheses beneath the averages. Source: BankScope  
Figure 2.1 Average bank size in Central and Eastern Europe (€mln), 2002 
Source: BankScope, EBRD (2006) and national central banks. SR and SV refer to the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia.
Appendix 9 shows the average bank size in each country of  the three regions. In 2002, 
average size of  banks in the Czech Republic and Poland started to be comparable 
to that of  banks in Italy, Austria and Germany. Figure 2.1 shows the negative 
correlation, with a value of  -0.34, of  average bank size with the number of  banks 
relative to the size of  the population. Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania have small 
banks. Latvia, Croatia and Slovenia have most banks. A ratio of  four banks per one 
million inhabitants is common in the region. 
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growth occurred up to 1998. Next, bank growth took off, especially in 2000/01. This 
development coincides with the privatisations, mergers and foreign bank entry in 
those years. See chapter 1 for details. Despite the fact that CEE bank growth takes 
off  only from 1997, the trend is similar to that of  former EU banks. In contrast, bank 
growth in the SEE/ CIS countries is virtually absent. 
Figure 2.2 Average growth in bank size (1995 =100), 1995- 2002
Bank size is determined as the average of  country averages. Source: BankScope. Bank size is 
based on nominal assets.
Figure 2.3a-c relates previous findings to the development in size of  foreign and 
domestic banks in the three regions. The dotted columns in each of  the figures show 
the average size of  all banks, in line with Table 2.1. For the CEE area, figure 2.3a 
shows that the average size of  all banks and the average size of  foreign banks exhibit 
similar trends. The figure also shows that domestic banks decrease in size. Specifically, 
foreign bank size has been steadily growing from €300mln in 1995 to over €2bn in 
2002. In the same period, domestic bank size shrunk from an average of  over €2bn in 
1995 to only €750 mln in 2002. The increasing foreign bank size might be explained 
by the acquisitions by foreign banks of  large privatised state-owned banks in the 
region and by mergers between foreign owned local banks.3 The diminishing role of  
domestic owned banks is in line with the results of  chapter 1. 
In contrast, in the former EU average bank size is predominantly determined by 
growth in domestic owned banks, as both groups exhibit a similar trend. The average 
size of  a domestic bank grew from €6bn in 1995 to nearly €20bn. Foreign bank size 
reached a little more than €5bn over the period. Data for foreign and domestic banks 
in CIS/SEE countries is more difficult to interpret due to scarcity of  ownership data. 
Figure 2.3c suggests that in the less developed transition economies, domestic bank 
3 For example, in 1998, Austrian Creditanstalt absorbed Bank Austria. As a result, the respective 
subsidiaries of  both parent banks in Central and Eastern Europe are merged. In 2001, German 
HVB Bank acquired the Bank Austria Creditantalt combination. Again, subsidiaries of  both 
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size generally exceeds the size of  foreign banks and that the size of  the latter hardly 
increased in the 1990s. Second, one may argue that in 2002, average foreign bank 
size in the CEE/CIS region was similar to the size of  foreign banks in CEE countries 
five years earlier. 
Figure 2.3a Average foreign bank size, EU15 (€bn), 1995-2002
Source Figures 2.3a-c: BankScope. For a summary of  the sample, see Appendix 8.
Figure 2.3b Average foreign bank size, CEE countries (€bn), 1995-2002
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Table 2.2 shows the main banking assets in the three regions classified by its main 
components: (i) total loans - net, (ii) total other earning assets, (iii) total non earning 
assets, and (iv) fixed assets.4 The four components are presented per region as a ratio 
of  total banking assets. Total loans –net are lowest in the CEE region. Only from 2002 
the loan ratio seems to pick up significantly in terms of  total bank assets. This result 
is in line with the findings in chapter 1 that credit to the private sector/GDP picked 
up in 2002. In the same period total other earning assets remained at a stale level around 
42-45 percent of  total assets, while in the EU other earning assets exhibited a clear 
declining trend. What did drop in terms in the average CEE bank were the non-earning 
assets: from 9.5 percent in 1995 to 6.5 percent in 2002. On this asset item CEE banks 
converged to the average EU15 banks. The average CEE bank also converged to 
a EU15 bank in terms of  fixed assets, although its level is still higher. Combining 
branches and the liquidation of  branches in rural areas may have added to the lower 
fixed assets in CEE. In the average CIS/SEE bank total non-earning assets and fixed assets 
in 2002 were on a level, which was normal in a CEE bank in 1995. 
Table 2.2 Decomposition of  bank assets (% Total Assets), 1995-2002










1995  46.3 44.0 31.6 46.8 41.7 43.6 5.5 9.3 17.3 1.5 5.0 7.5
1996 47.1 40.7 40.3 45.9 44.5 37.2 5.6 9.0 13.7 1.4 5.8 8.8
1997 48.1 40.0 42.5 44.4 45.4 35.6 6.1 9.0 13.6 1.4 5.6 8.3
1998 48.9 42.6 44.1 43.1 43.1 36.1 6.7 8.8 12.3 1.3 5.6 7.6
1999 50.2 43.1 45.3 41.4 43.0 36.2 7.2 8.2 11.1 1.2 5.6 7.5
2000 51.1 43.4 43.7 40.4 44.3 38.4 7.4 7.5 11.6 1.1 4.8 6.3
2001 51.4 42.0 46.4 39.4 45.7 35.6 8.0 8.1 12.6 1.1 4.1 5.4
2002 52.3 46.9 48.0 38.7 42.8 36.5 8.0 6.6 10.5 1.0 3.7 5.0
Yearly data are averages of  country averages. EU refers to the member states of  the EU15. 
Source: BankScope. Total loans – net (loans –net) is the sum of  total customer loans and problem 
loans, minus loan loss reserves. Total other earning assets (other earning assets) include the sum of  
total securities and bonds. Total securities include deposits with banks, due from central banks, 
due from other banks, government securities, investment securities, and trading securities.
Figures 2.4a-c decompose total loans by maturity. Maturity refers to the time to maturity, 
i.e. the time until the loan contract ends, if  not renegotiated. First, up to 2002, the 
maturity structure of  loans extended by CEE banks hardly changed. The average 
4 The four main components in Table 2.2 of  the assets side consist of  several sub-items. The 
remainder of  this section will further examine the components and maturity of  total loans and 
discards the components of  the rest of  the three main items of  the asset side.
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maturity even dropped in 1997 when the relative amount of  loans with maturities up 
to 6 months replaced loans with longer maturities. 
Figure 2.4a Maturity of  total customer loans, EU15, 1995-2002 
Data refer to Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Sweden. 
Source: BankScope.
Figure 2.4b Maturity of  total customer loans, CEE countries, 1995-2002
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Figure 2.4c Maturity of  total customer loans, SEE/CIS countries, 1995-2002   
Data refer to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Rus-
sia and Uzbekistan. Source: BankScope
However, in 2002 the maturity of  credit in Central and Eastern Europe seemed to 
rise as loans with 1-5 year maturities replace loan contracts ending within the year. 
Second, in addition to the increasing maturities of  customer loans, the diversification 
in the maturity structure of  the loan portfolio has increased.  
 Both features hint at the convergence of  the loan portfolio of  the average CEE 
bank to that of  a bank in Western Europe. In the EU15 long-term lending clearly 
dominates (Figure 2.4a). For example, loans maturing 5 years from now make up 
more than 30 percent of  loan portfolio. In the CEE region the share of  long-term 
credit does not exceed 10 percent of  the portfolio. EU15 banks also lend a substantial 
amount short term: 30 per cent of  total loans have a maturity of  less than 3 months. 
Short term lending by a CEE bank is not so common. In the CIS and SEE countries, 
at least two thirds of  all loans mature within 1 year, and this percentage hardly 
changed over the period. 
Table 2.3 Decomposition total customer loans (% total customer loans), 1995-2002
Public sector Mortgages Lease Other Loans Other Corporate 
EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE
1995 9.0 10.9 6.5 0.0 1.3 0.0 80.9 59.6 2.1 26.9
1996 3.7 6.2 13.3 0.0 1.4 0.3 79.2 46.9 2.1 41.1
1997 3.4 4.9 10.2 0.0 1.6 1.9 82.3 26.6 2.1 58.9
1998 3.2 3.9 11.3 0.0 2.0 4.3 80.2 21.4 3.0 61.4
1999 3.1 2.3 12.2 0.0 2.0 3.9 79.1 22.1 3.3 65.3
2000 3.0 3.3 13.2 0.0 2.3 4.3 78.8 20.4 2.6 63.0
2001 2.7 4.0 13.4 0.0 2.5 8.2 78.8 15.1 2.6 58.0
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Notes: Loans to the public sector include loans to municipalities and government, loans to state 
enterprises and advances to or guaranteed by public authorities. Lease includes leasing assets 
and lease receivables. Loans to other corporate include loans to domestic and private companies and 
loans to financial (non-bank) companies. Other loans include to trade receivables, overdrafts, se-
curities held under repurchase agreements, accrued interest and factoring, overdue instalments, 
financing for import/export and foreign currency loans, doubtful loans, and bills. Data refer to 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Latvia and Lithuania. Source: BankScope. 
Table 2.3 decomposes total loans in: (i) loans to the public sector (ii) mortgages, (iii) lease 
products, (iv) other loans, and (v) loans to other corporate.5 For the CIS/SEE region 
no information on loan products is available. The conclusion for the development 
in loan products in CEE is twofold. First, loans to municipalities and government 
decreased in the period 1995-2002. Second, the amount of  hire-purchase (HP) and 
lease products of  CEE banks exceeds that of  EU15 banks.6 Although Table 2.3 gives 
loan product information in the CEE region only based on observations in Latvia 
and Lithuania, the conclusions seem to hold for the whole CEE region. For example, 
the first finding is in line with the statement of  the EBRD that ‘[…] governments 
in transition countries have scaled back their borrowing from the banking system, 
thereby freeing up credit to the private sector’ (EBRD 2005). Thus, the observed 
shift from credit to the public sector to credit to the private sector noted in chapter 
1 is consistent with the information from CEE banks’ balance sheets in Table 2.3. 
The growth in HP and lease products seems to hold for Central and Eastern Europe 
in general. Although leasing in the EU is often tax-driven, De Haas and Naaborg 
(2006, p.173) find other explanations for the leasing boom in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Based on bank interviews, the authors find that ‘when leasing, the bank 
retains the ownership of  the object leased and can simply repossess if  the debtor goes 
bankrupt, thus avoiding any lengthy bankruptcy procedures to take possession of  
collateral. Especially in the Baltic States, the rapid spread of  leasing at the beginning 
of  the transition process was related to the limited protection of  collateral. Banks also 
used leasing to get around the insufficient track record of  firms, which made credit 
screening difficult. […] Although the track records of  firms have improved in recent 
years, leasing continues to be an important way of  financing in Central Europe and 
the Baltic States.’
5  Unfortunately, Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing was not able to provide the definitions of  
the loan products as available in the BankScope database. CEE banks did not provide informa-
tion regarding the mortgages. 
6 Hire Purchase (HP): a method of  buying goods in which the purchaser takes possession of  them 
as soon as he has paid an initial instalment of  the price (a deposit) and obtains ownership of  
the goods when he has paid all the agreed number of  subsequent instalments. A hire-purchase 
agreement differs from a credit-sale agreement and sale by instalments (or a deferred payment 
agreement) because in these transactions ownership passes when the contract is signed. It also 
differs from a contract of  hire, because in this case ownership never passes. A lease is a contract 
by which the owner of  property allows another to use it for a specified time, usually in return for 





Figure 2.4 presents the ratio of  equity over total assets. This ratio has remained about 
5 per cent over the period for banks in the EU15, while the equity ratio for CEE banks 
has risen from about 8 per cent of  total assets to over 10 per cent. The equity ratio is 
highest for banks in the SEE/CIS countries at around 14 per cent. This may reflect 
these banks’ high levels of  risk, as equity acts as a buffer against unexpected losses. A 
more appropriate measure of  strength is the BIS capital ratio, but unfortunately this 
was not available for most of  the banks outside the EU15.
 Table 2.5 decomposes banks’ liabilities into: (i) deposits, (ii) money market 
funding, (iii) other funding, (iv) loan loss and other reserves, and (v) other liabilities. 
First, regarding the set of  liabilities CEE banks are funded less diversified than EU15 
banks. In this respect CEE banks hardly differ from SEE/CIS banks as both are 
for almost 90% funded by deposits. EU15 banks are funded for less than 70% with 
deposits. Deposit funding is decreasing in both the EU15 and the CEE countries. 
However, where money market funding seems to be the substitute for deposit funding 
in the EU15, money market funding seems to be less popular in the CEE, another 
feature that CEE banks have in common with SEE/CIS banks. The use of  this type 
of  funding is even diminishing from 1999 onwards. This is probably due to the less 
developed money markets in both regions. From Table 2.4, it is difficult to identify a 
single alternative CEE banks prefer over deposit funding. 
Table 2.4 Average equity and liabilities (% assets), 1995-2002
Year EU15 CEE SEE and CIS
Liabilities Equity Liabilities Equity Liabilities Equity
1995 95.1 4.9 91.8 8.2 79.9 20.1
1996 95.2 4.8 92.7 7.3 87.7 12.3
1997 95.4 4.6 90.0 10.0 84.6 15.4
1998 95.2 4.8 90.0 10.0 85.4 14.6
1999 94.8 5.2 89.2 10.8 85.6 14.4
2000 94.8 5.2 89.5 10.5 85.6 14.4
2001 94.9 5.1 89.8 10.2 86.2 13.8
2002 95.1 4.9 89.7 10.3 86.4 13.6
Source: BankScope.
Figures 2.5a-c decompose total deposits in the three regions by maturity. Deposits in 
the EU15 are highly liquid - about 50 percent are in the form of  demand and savings 
deposits, which can be with drawn at call, another 20 per cent of  deposits have a 
maturity within 3 months. The proportion of  liquid deposits is slightly lower in CEE 
countries, with 60 percent having a maturity of  less than 3 months, and it is much 
lower in the SEE/CIS countries where only 35 percent of  deposits are available on 
an immediate basis. Deposits with a maturity of  6-12 months are dominant in the 
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SEE/CIS, constituting about two-thirds of  all deposits. In the EU15, the maturity of  
the deposit portfolio changed little over the period 1995-2003, whereas in CEE there 
was a gradual increase in the relative size of  long-term maturing deposits (1-5 years) 
from 1 per cent in 1995 to around 11 per cent in 2003. In the SEE/CIS countries 
long-term deposits seem to be non-existent. 
Table 2.5 Decomposition of  liabilities (% of  liabilities), 1995-2002
Year       Deposits Money Market  Other funding          LLR        Other
EU CEE S/C EU CEE S/C EU CEE S/C EU CEE S/C EU CEE S/C
1995 78.8 87.2 72.4 7.0 1.3 4.0 8.1 1.9 5.4 0.2 0.0 1.6 5.8 6.3 16.6
1996 76,7 85.3 78.3 6.4 1.9 3.9 9.9 3.7 7.9 0.3 0.0 0.1 6.7 5.3 9.8
1997 74.9 88.4 82.5 6.8 0.8 3.7 10.6 3.5 6.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 7.4 4.8 7.4
1998 74.1 90.4 75.9 7.0 1.7 4.6 10.4 2.0 7.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 8.1 4.7 11.7
1999 72.1 91.9 80.7 8.1 2.0 3.5 11.1 3.9 10.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 8.0 4.4 5.4
2000 69.8 90.6 83.4 8.7 1.6 2.1 11.9 3.3 10.0 1.1 0.1 0.1 8.5 5.1 4.5
2001 69.3 90.8 87.9 8.8 0.8 1.5 12.6 2.6 6.9 1.1 0.2 0.0 8.3 4.7 3.6
2002 68.0 89.6 88.8 8.7 0.9 1.7 13.1 3.0 6.7 1.1 0.3 0.1 9.1 3.9 2.8
Total Deposits (deposits) is the sum of  customer deposits and banks deposits. Total money 
market funding (money market) includes certificates of  deposit, debt securities, and other ne-
gationable instruments. Total other funding (other) is the sum of  other bonds, subordinated 
debt, and other funding. Loan loss reserves (LLR) include other reserves. The column ‘Other’ 
refers to other liabilities. EU refers to the Member States of  the EU15; S/C refers to the tran-
sition economies in South Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of  Independent States. 
Source: BankScope
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Source: BankScope. Data refer to Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
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Source: BankScope. Data refer to the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.
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Source: BankScope. Data refer to the Ukraine, Albania, Belarus, Georgia, and Macedonia. 
2.6 Foreign banks’ balance sheet 
This section aims to answer two questions: (i) how do banking activities of  foreign owned 
banks in Central and Eastern Europe compare to those of  domestic banking in the 
region? and (ii) is foreign banking different in Central and Eastern Europe compared 
to foreign banking in the EU15 and the SEE/CIS region? Table 2.5 compares the 
main balance sheet items of  foreign and domestic banks in the three regions. In line 
with Table 2.2 in section 2.4 I start by examining the main components on the asset 
side. Asset ratios allow for three conclusions. First, given their significant higher total 
loans - net ratio, foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe seem to lend relatively 
more than domestic banks. However, CEE foreign banks have significantly less loan 
loss reserves than domestic banks. As a result, the levels of  total customer loans between 
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foreign banks and domestic banks do not differ significantly.7 This finding is in line 
with the conclusion of  chapter 1, that only from 1998, foreign banks’ share in credit 
to the private sector started to match the share of  their presence. However, Table 2.5 
shows that foreign banks still have a significantly higher total non-earnings assets ratio 
compared to domestic banks in CEE. In addition, other earning assets of  domestic 
banks are higher than for foreign banks implicating that domestic banks are focused 
on niche markets. The table also shows that, similarly to the early transition period 
in Central and Eastern Europe, foreign banks in the SEE/CIS area less involved 
in lending activities than domestic banks. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
foreign banks have more problems in lending in host countries where the cultural 
and/ or institutional difference with the home country is high. Foreign banks in all 
three regions suffer significantly less from loan loss reserves and, in the EU15 and SEE/
CIS countries, from problem loans. This finding is consistent with the theories predicting 
a lower risk preference of  foreign banks relative to domestic banks (see Section 1.2). 
Given a significantly higher other total earning assets ratio, foreign banks in the CIS/SEE 
countries are involved in other banking activities, e.g. securities and bonds. 
The loan product section in Table 2.5 supports the hypothesis that foreign banks are 
relatively more involved in corporate lending than domestic banks.8 The loans to other 
corporate ratio in both Central and Eastern Europe and the EU15 are significantly 
higher for foreign banks. In addition, CEE foreign banks are more involved in lease 
operations. Both findings would confirm theoretical literature that suggests that foreign 
banks suffer from asymmetric information about the local market and rather focus on 
the less risky corporate sector. The average higher loans to municipalities/ government ratio 
of  foreign banks seems to be in line with the finding in chapter 1 that for most part 
of  1995-2002, foreign banks were more involved in public lending than in lending to 
the private sector. Third, the loan portfolios of  foreign banks in transition economies 
offer a more diversified maturity structure than those of  the domestic banks. More 
specifically, in the CEE and the CIS/SEE region, foreign banks lend more on both 
the very short and on the very long term than domestic banks do. In the CEE area, 
foreign banks’ share of  short-term loans, with maturities between 3 and 6 months, is 
significantly higher than that of  domestic banks in the region. In the EU15 and the 
SEE/CIS countries, the loan portfolio of  foreign banks contains significantly more 
loans with 5+ year maturities than the portfolios of  domestic owned banks. Domestic 
banks seem to lend more in the mid-term segment of  the maturity spectrum (1-5 
years). 
 
7 Total Loans – Net is the sum of total customer loans (a) + problem loans (b) - loan loss reserves (c).
8 Table 2.5 presents ratios calculated as averages of  total group observations. A caveat of  this 
approach is that I assume that year effects similarly affect domestic owned and foreign owned 
banks. However, results are in line with ratios presented by Naaborg and Scholtens (2006), 




Table 2.6 Balance sheet ratios of  foreign and domestic banks, 1995-2002 
EU15 CEE countries CIS/SEE region
FOR DOM FOR DOM FOR DOM
A. Assets (% total assets)
Total customer loans (a) 46.4 47.9 46.1 42.8 31.6 54.0***
Problem loans (b) 0.1 0.2** 0.2 0.4 0.1 2.8**
Loan loss reserve (c) 0.2 0.4* 2.2 3.1* 2.4 5.4***
Total loans – Net 46.3 47.7 44.0* 40.1 33.6 54.0***
Total other earning assets 47.6 45.0 42.3 48.7** 48.6*** 27.2
Total non-earning assets 4.9 5.9** 8.9*** 6.5 13.5 12.4
Total fixed assets 1.2 1.3 4.8 4.6 6.2 6.4
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Products (% total customer loans)
Loans to the public sector 0.9 4.8** 2.6* 0.1 n.a. n.a.
Mortgages 3.6 14.2*** 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a.
HP/ Lease 3.0 2.1 7.1** 1.3 n.a. n.a.
Other loans 81.9 76.1 6.7 44.8 n.a. n.a.
Loans to other corporate 10.6** 2.8 76.9* 38.8 n.a. n.a.
100.0 100.0 93.3 84.9 n.a. n.a.
Maturity (% total customer loans)
Loans sub 3 months 29.8 31.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Loans 3-6 months 0.4 0.3 6.3** 0.0 56.8 41.4
Loans 6-12 months 19.8 21.7 46.9 47.8 29.7 22.6
Loans 1-5 years 20.7 21.0 30.2 38.6 8.6 33.6***
Loans 5+ years 25.8** 19.9 15.0 13.6 3.4* 0.0
Loans (no split available) 1.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
98.0 94.0 98.4 100.0 98.5 98.2
B. Equity and liabilities
Liabilities 93.5 94.7*** 88.7 89.7 80.0 83.1
Equity 6.5*** 5.3 11.3 10.3 20.0 16.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Liabilities (% of  total liabilities)
Total customer deposits 81.6*** 74.6 89.4** 86.1 90.1*** 76.9
Total money market funding 4.8 8.6*** 2.0 1.9 2.2 4.8**
Total other funding 6.8 9.7** 2.8 6.2* 2.9 14.2**
Total loan loss & other reserves 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1***
Other liabilities 6.5 6.6 5.6 5.0 4.8 3.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Ratios for foreign (FOR) and domestic (DOM) banks are averages. Loan product ratios for 
CEE countries are based on banks in Latvia and Lithuania. Loan product ratios are based 
on countries in which at least 73 per cent of  loans could be categorized. For product defini-
tions see Table 2.3. Loan maturity ratios are calculated based only on banks from countries 
for which at least 78 per cent of  loans could be categorized. To identify significance levels of  
differences in means, test statistic T = [(X1-X2) – (μ1-μ2)]/ [(S1/n1) + (S2/n2)]
1/2 and Student’s 
t Distribution are used, with ν = min(n1,n2) - 1. *, **, *** represent significance levels at 1%, 
5%, and 10%.
Regarding the liability side of  banks’ balance sheets, the data in Table 2.5 suggest 
that foreign banks are relatively equity rich compared to domestic banks. However, 
means are significantly different only in the EU15. I find convincing evidence that 
foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe and the other benchmark regions are 
relatively more funded with deposits than domestic banks. Instead, domestic banks 
use a more varied set of  funding sources, e.g. money market funding. Data across the three 
regions suggest that the less developed the host country, the more foreign banks fund 
themselves with deposits. This finding suggests that CEE foreign banks are relatively 
more involved in retail banking than foreign banks in the EU15 and those in the 
SEE/CIS region. The next chapter will examine this hypothesis more in detail 
2.7 Conclusion
Chapter 2 extends the analysis on the role of  foreign banks in Central and Eastern 
Europe in several ways. The chapter aims at comparing developments in foreign 
banking in Central and Eastern Europe with foreign banking in developed economies 
and foreign banking in transition countries with low economic development. 
Specifically, the chapter answers the following questions: (i) how does the size of  a 
foreign bank compare to the size of  a domestic bank? (ii) which items make up total 
assets of  a foreign bank? (iii) what is the structure of  the credit portfolio, and (iv) how 
are foreign banks funded? The first benchmark consists of  the 15 EU Member States 
that made up the EU up to May 2004. The second benchmark consists of  16 transition 
economies in South Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of  Independent States 
(CIS). The analysis starts in 1995, the year in which local governments in Central and 
Eastern Europe still owned the majority of  banking assets. For a period of  eight years 
bank balance sheets in the three regions are followed until 2002, the year in which 
credit to the private sector in CEE started to pick up. The analysis is based on 31,319 
bank observations of  commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative banks in the 
three regions. For reasons of  homogeneity other banks from the BankScope database 
are disregarded.  
The conclusions of  this chapter are as follows. First, the difference in size between 




During this period, a CEE bank grew from €560mln to over €1.3bn. The biggest banks 
operate in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary; the smallest banks are found in 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. An average EU15 bank measured €4.6bn 
in 1995 and in 2002 €15.6. Although the size of  CEE banks started to augment from 
1997, banks in SEE and CIS countries hardly increased in size. Foreign banks in CEE 
countries grew, while domestic banks decreased in size. This trend can be explained 
by the intraregional mergers and acquisitions and the privatisations of  former state 
owned banks to foreign investors. In this respect the CEE banking sector differs from 
that in the EU15 and SEE/CIS countries, where foreign banks are usually smaller 
than domestic banks.
 Chapter 2 confirms the findings of  the first chapter regarding the low degree of  
intermediation in Central and Eastern Europe in the period 1995-2002. The share 
of  loans in total assets of  an average bank in this region is lower than in Western 
Europe; only in 2002 the loans to assets ratio increases. The same picture arises in 
banks’ balance sheets in SEE and CIS countries. It must be noted that the share 
of  non-earning assets decreased in banks in the transition regions, just as the share 
of  fixed assets within total assets. Explanations for the former can be the improved 
macro economic prospects, a decrease of  the information asymmetry regarding the 
borrower and an improved functioning of  institutions. The decrease in fixed assets 
can be explained by the closure, merger and/or restructuring of  bank branches. 
The maturity of  loans and the diversity in maturity of  the average credit portfolio 
increases in CEE. The trends point at a convergence of  the characteristics of  credit 
portfolios of  EU15 and CEE banks. In Western Europe, 40 percent of  the loans have 
a maturity of  less than a year, in CEE countries this ratio amounts to 50 percent and 
in SEE/CIS countries this ratio is more than 60 percent.
 From the balance sheets of  banks in the Baltic States it turns out that the share of  
loans to the public sector in total customer loans has decreased from 1995 onwards. 
This finding is additional evidence to the finding of  chapter 1 that in the 1990s the 
credit market in CEE has been suffering from a crowding out effect that has turned 
to a halt in 2002. In addition, bank balance sheets confirm that the use of  leasing 
by banks in Central and Eastern Europe is quite popular. Apart from tax reasons, 
additional explanations are the problems in seizing collateral and the absence of  track 
records of  potential borrowers.
The liability side of  bank balances in CEE countries and those in SEE and CIS 
countries are more similar than those of  EU15 banks. For example, 90 percent of  
the liabilities are formed by deposits and only a fraction by money market funding; 
in EU15 banks 70 percent are deposits and almost 9 percent is funded on the money 
market.
 Next, chapter 2 investigates to what extent the balance sheets of  CEE foreign 
banks and domestic banks differ and whether these differences are characteristic for 
CEE. The first conclusion is that on average foreign and domestic banks had similar 
loans to assets on their balance sheets. This finding confirms the picture drawn in 
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chapter 1 that foreign banks extended relatively more credit after 1998 and relatively 
little credit before that year. Similarly, in Western Europe there is no difference in the 
amount of  credit extended by foreign and domestic banks. However, in the sample 
of  developing transition countries domestic banks extend more credit than foreign 
banks. 
 Furthermore, this chapter finds that foreign banks prefer to focus on corporate 
banking and leasing activities. Domestic banks in Western Europe predominantly 
focus on loans to the public sector and mortgages. The credit portfolio of  foreign 
banks in transition countries is characterized by a broader spectrum of  maturities 
than that of  domestic banks. This may be interpreted as the introduction by foreign 
banks of  new banking products. A last result is that foreign banks, more than domestic 
banks, give credit with longer maturities. This finding is additional back up for the 
hypothesis that foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe primarily focus on the 
corporate sector. Chapter 3 will study this hypothesis further.
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